






The Bank of Canada Should Start to 
Raise Interest Rates Now
Michael Parkin
In this issue...
Higher rates now are the right medicine: if inflation breaks loose of its anchor
and moves seriously above target, the situation can be addressed only with
seriously above-normal interest rates.
NO. 139, JULY 2011
MONETARY POLICYWhen the Bank of Canada will begin raising interest rates is looking very different than when
it should even though the risks of postponement are growing. If more “no-change” decisions
are made by the Bank of Canada regarding its policy interest rate, inflation expectations
might begin to slip loose of their 2 percent anchor. Further, with the Fed continuing to hold
a near-zero rate, the US dollar is likely to continue its steady slide. If the Canadian dollar
moves at least partially with the US dollar, because the Bank of Canada keeps its interest rate
close to the federal funds rate, the higher inflation rates of energy and other commodity prices
that are currently deemed temporary might start to look permanent.
Alongside these concerns is the limited direct effect that monetary policy has on the course of
real GDP growth, the output gap, and the unemployment rate. As the Bank repeatedly states,
the best contribution that monetary policy can make to these objectives is to achieve a low
and predictable inflation rate. Too vigorous a direct pursuit of output and employment
objectives in the short term might end up spilling over into inflation as the real economy
remains stubbornly unresponsive.
The forgoing concerns are statements about risks, not central forecasts. But they are risks that,
if they occur, bring an ugly set of policy choices. A return to seriously above-target inflation
can be addressed only with seriously above-normal interest rates. That is a risk worth
avoiding. And it can be avoided only by embarking sooner, rather than later, on the process
of steadily increasing the overnight rate target. 
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“T
o the extent that the
expansion continues and
the current material excess
supply in the economy is gradually
absorbed, some of the considerable
monetary policy stimulus currently in
place will be eventually withdrawn,
consistent with achieving the 2 percent
inflation target. Such reduction would
need to be carefully considered.”
1
So said the Bank of Canada in a press release
announcing its May 31, 2011, interest rate decision.
That decision leaves the outlook for the overnight
rate target extremely uncertain, but it is likely to
remain at its current 1 percent level for a further,
unknown period. This uncertainty raises two
questions. First, when will the Bank embark on a
process of significant rate increases to restore a
more neutral monetary policy setting, and what
will trigger the start of this process? And second, is
the Bank right to be cautious about raising the
target overnight rate or is it leaning too far in the
direction of monetary stimulus?
I will attempt to answer the first of these questions
by looking in three places and asking for each
what it implies about future interest rate changes:
first, the Bank of Canada’s current assessment of
the state of the economy; second, the Bank’s own
description of its rate-setting strategy; and third,
patterns in the Bank’s past behaviour.
It is the third source of answers that provides
the only surprise, and it leaves in limbo the question
of “when.” Despite the independence of Canadian
monetary policy, the Bank of Canada is unlikely
to embark on a significant rate hike path until the
US Federal Reserve starts its own movement
toward a more normal level of US interest rates.
That event is unlikely to occur soon, but pinning
down the likely starting date is impossible.
Notwithstanding my prediction that rates will
remain low for a further period, delay is risky, so
my prescription is to start raising them on July 19,
2011, with the expectation that they will be raised
by 25 basis points every decision day until May 2012,
to bring the level of the overnight rate to 3 percent. 
Of course, if circumstances change, the
prescription will change. But based on what we
know today, that is the right medicine to take.
The key reason this is the right medicine is that
there is an important asymmetry in the cost of
errors, and the risks need to be unbalanced away
from rising inflation. If inflation breaks loose of its
anchor and moves seriously above target, the
situation can be addressed only with seriously
above-normal interest rates. That is a risk to be
avoided – and it can be, but it requires embarking
sooner rather than later on the process of steadily
increasing the overnight rate target.
Before developing the reasons for my prescription,
I turn to the task of predicting the Bank’s next
interest rate move.
The Bank’s Current Assessment of the
State of the Economy
The Bank of Canada sees a Canadian economy
with “material slack” and well-anchored inflation
expectations. It believes that, by mid-2012, global
and domestic expansion will restore full employment
(or, equivalently, close the output gap – the gap
between actual and potential gross domestic
product, GDP) and that, while core inflation is
low and headline consumer price index (CPI)
inflation is high, both will converge on 2 percent.
The Bank sees the risks to its central forecast as
balanced. A strong Canadian dollar and high
household debt levels could slow the return of full
employment, while rising commodity prices,
global inflation, and stronger-than-expected
household expenditures could speed the expansion.
I thank Philippe Bergevin, Colin Busby, Ben Dachis, Thor Koeppl, David Laidler, Angelo Melino, Finn Poschmann, Chris Ragan, Nick Rowe,
and Pierre Siklos for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 Bank of Canada, “Bank of Canada retains overnight rate target at 1 per cent,” Press Release, May 31, 2011; available online at
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2011/05/press-releases/fad-press-release-2011-05-31/.| 2 Backgrounder 139
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It is in this context and with this assessment of
balanced risks that the Bank is comfortable
keeping the overnight rate target at its current 
1 percent level and signalling that it expects it to
remain there for an extended period. If the central
forecast turns out to be correct, it will not be until
late 2011 or early 2012 that significant interest
rate increases begin.
Does this conclusion sit well with the Bank’s
deeper objective and overall interest-rate-setting
strategy?
The Bank’s Objectives and Strategy
Through the years since the first “Joint Statement”
2
on inflation targeting, the Bank of Canada has set
out its monetary policy objective, rationale, and
strategy both on its website and in the frontispiece
to the Monetary Policy Report.
The Bank’s web page explains that “Canada’s
monetary policy is built on a framework consisting
of two key components: (1) a flexible exchange
rate and (2) an inflation-control target.”
3 The
Bank goes on to explain that, freed by the flexible
exchange rate to pursue the needs of Canada’s own
economy, it uses monetary policy to contribute to
achieving low, stable, and predictable inflation,
sustained economic growth, and moderate
fluctuations in output and employment. It sets the
target overnight rate target to achieve its inflation
target over a period extending over six to eight
future quarters, and it uses core CPI inflation as
the indicator of underlying inflation.
The Bank’s monetary policy stance in June
2011 is firmly in line with its declared objective
and strategy. It is holding the target overnight rate
low and providing monetary stimulus because it
sees an underemployed economy placing downward
pressure on an already low core inflation rate, and
looking six to eight quarters into the future it sees
the risk of higher inflation balanced by the risk of
slower expansion and lower inflation.
Based on the Bank’s inflation-control target and
strategy and on its current assessment of the
economy, there is every reason to expect the Bank
to hold the interest rate low for an extended period.
Does this expectation align with the Bank’s own
past pattern of behaviour?
Influences on the Bank’s Interest 
Rate Decisions
Thinking about the path followed by the overnight
rate target, the first thing that stands out is that
changes occur relatively infrequently, and when
they do occur, the steps are usually small. All the
rate increases in recent years have been 25 basis
points, and the only rate cuts to exceed 25 basis
points occurred during a period of financial crisis.
4
The implication of these facts is that the current
level of the overnight rate has a big influence on
its level at the next decision date. Gradual
adjustment of the overnight rate is rational in the
face of uncertainty, and the consequential
smoothing of the response of the overnight rate to
current influences almost certainly improves
monetary policy performance.
But the overnight rate does change, so what
changes it?
Because the Bank’s mandate is to keep the
inflation rate as close as possible to 2 percent per
year and inside a range between 1 and 3 percent,
the main reason to change the rate is a state of the
economy judged likely to miss the inflation target.
A state of strong demand, high capacity utilization,
and low unemployment creates a generally held
expectation of rising inflation, so the Bank would
most likely counter with a rise in the overnight
rate target. A state of weak demand, low capacity
utilization, and high unemployment creates an
expectation of falling inflation, so the Bank would
most likely counter with a fall in the overnight
rate target.
2 For the most recent such statement, see Bank of Canada (2007).
3 See “Monetary Policy – Introduction,” online at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/monetary-policy-introduction/.
4 Between May 2002 and May 2011, the overnight rate target was raised 17 times, each by 25 basis points, while the target was lowered 
15 times, 9 of them by 25 basis points.Backgrounder 139 | 3
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The Bank’s measure of the output gap as the
percentage gap between real GDP and its estimate
of potential GDP provides a broad summary
measure of slack and tightness. At full employment,
that gap is zero. With excess demand, the gap is
positive; with excess supply, the gap is negative.
Although the Bank looks at a large number of
variables as indicators of future inflation, many 
are correlated with the output gap, so if the Bank
moves the overnight rate target in response to 
the output gap, it is responding to expected 
future inflation.
5
It turns out that these two influences, the current
overnight rate and the output gap, explain 88 percent
of the variability in the overnight rate (as represented
by the adjusted R
2, see equation 1, Table 1).
6
What about the current inflation rate? Would it
not also influence the Bank’s interest rate decision?
The answer appears to be “no.” Adding either the
core inflation rate, which the Bank uses as its
“operational guide,” or the headline CPI inflation
rate, which the Bank must target, to the list of
influences on the Bank’s decision does not improve
our ability to predict what the Bank will do
(equations 2 and 3, Table 1).
It is not surprising that the current inflation
rate has no impact on the Bank’s decision. The
inflation rate that the Bank can influence and that
it targets is six to eight quarters in the future. The
expected future inflation rate is related, in part, to
the current state of demand, and that is why the
output gap, rather than the current inflation rate,
influences the Bank’s decision.
Rather than rely only on the current state of
demand as measured by the output gap, the Bank
could react to direct measures of expected future
inflation. We know from the detailed analysis
presented in each Monetary Policy Report that the
Bank goes to great lengths to forecast inflation.
However, the Bank’s own forecasts are conflated
with its own unknown expected future path for
the overnight rate target, and they always converge
on 2 percent at some point in the eight-quarter
forecast horizon. For this reason, we cannot
explore how the overnight rate responds to the
Bank’s own forecast of inflation.
But we can examine whether the overnight rate
target responds to a market expectation of future
inflation. One such measure of expected inflation
is the yield spread on conventional government of
Canada bonds and real-return bonds.
7 Adding this
measure of the expected inflation rate to the
previous level of the interest rate and the output
gap improves our ability to predict the Bank’s
decision, but not by much. These three variables
account for 88.5 percent of the variability of the
overnight rate (equation 4, Table 1).
What explains the other 11.5 percent of changes
in the overnight rate target? Part of the answer is
the very large number of Canadian and global
variables that the Bank monitors and that change
from month to month depending on what is
happening in the global economy and what seems
important or is prominent on the Bank’s radar at
the time. The variables change and the weight
placed on them by the Governing Council change.
So we would expect there to be significant changes
in the overnight rate target that appear to be
random and that defy systematic explanation.
But it is worth asking whether there are any
other factors that have a stable and predictable
influence on the Bank. And there is one other
variable that the Bank cannot ignore: the
Canadian-US exchange rate.
5 It might be argued that the Bank responds to its forecast of the future output gap, rather than the current actual gap. But the current gap is
what predicts future inflation, and the Bank’s forecast of the gap always converges towards zero by the end of the eight-quarter forecast
horizon, so the current output gap is the preferred measure.
6 All the regression analysis I report here is based on quarterly data. Ideally, one would construct a dataset of variable frequency for each Bank
of Canada decision date, and use explanatory variables that measure the latest information available to the Bank. Such a study is worth
doing, and the economists inside the Bank are the best placed to undertake it.
7 This yield spread measures inflation expectations over the maturity of the bond, which is 10 years. Ideally, we would have two-year real-return
bonds to provide an inflation expectation over the relevant horizon. Nonetheless, with autocorrelated inflation, the expectations over the
shorter horizon will be correlated with those over the longer.| 4 Backgrounder 139
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Table 1: Influences on the Bank of Canada’s Interest Rate Decision
Notes:
1. The table reports Bank of Canada overnight rate target equations estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (equations 1, 2, and 3)or
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) (equations 4 and 5).
2. The data run from 1993:Q4 through 2010:Q4.
3. The dependent variable is the overnight rate target.
4. The data are quarterly averages of monthly observations for all variables except the output gap, which is the Bank of Canada’s quarterly
measure as revised in 2010:Q4.
5. The expected inflation rate is the yield spread between conventional long-term Government of Canada bonds and real-return bonds.
6. The exchange rate is CAD/USD.
7. For equations 4 and 5, which are estimated by 2SLS, the expected inflation rate and exchange rate are viewed as determined simultaneously
with the overnight rate target. The instruments for the first-stage estimation were lagged values of the overnight rate, the exchange rate,
and the expected inflation rate and federal funds rate. The following table shows some alternative versions of equation 5 and its robustness.



























Coefficient 0.297 0.894 0.111 0.881 OLS
t-statistic 2.12 19.13 2.70
2
Coefficient 0.524 0.895 0.109 -0.127 0.881 OLS
t-statistic 1.94 19.14 2.67 -0.98
3
Coefficient 0.449 0.892 0.134 -0.075 0.882 OLS
t-statistic 2.42 19.17 2.99 -1.25
4
Coefficient 0.009 0.869 0.113 0.141 0.885 2SLS
t-statistic 0.04 18.20 2.81 1.85
5
Coefficient -0.939 0.592 0.120 0.194 0.152 0.757 0.915 2SLS
t-statistic -2.25 8.57 3.00 2.85 4.26 2.35
Alternative Versions of Equation 5
Note: Data and calculations are available from the author on request.
Source: Author’s calculations from target overnight rate, output gap, Bank of Canada; yield spread on conventional Government of Canada
bonds and real-return bonds, Statistics Canada, Table 176-0041 (long-term bonds); exchange rate, Pacific Exchange Rate service,
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca; federal funds rate, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Coefficients t-statistics
Lags on Target Rate (TR) 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Intercept -1.961 -0.939 -0.874 -0.696 -3.33 -2.25 -2.16 -1.85
TR -one quarter prior 0.592 0.865 0.908 8.57 7 .30 8.00
TR -two quarters prior -0.276 -0.297 -2.71 -2.01
TR -three quarters prior -0.007 -0.07
Output Gap 0.204 0.120 0.098 0.094 3.56 3.00 2.49 2.62
Expected Inflation 0.374 0.194 0.182 0.126 3.87 2.85 2.71 1.93
Federal Funds Rate 0.357 0.152 0.146 0.143 8.85 4.26 4.21 4.55
Exchange Rate 1.836 0.757 0.754 0.690 4.25 2.35 2.43 2.41
Adjusted R
2 0.813 0.915 0.922 0.936Backgrounder 139 | 5
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As noted earlier, the Bank recognizes that
Canada’s flexible exchange rate is a crucial
precondition for the ability to pursue an
independent monetary policy. But having a
flexible exchange rate does not mean that the
Bank ignores the exchange rate. Nor does it mean
that monetary policy does not influence the
exchange rate. The Canadian dollar exchange rate
is flexible in the sense that it is determined by
market demand and supply without Bank of
Canada (or government of Canada) intervention
in the foreign exchange market. But the Bank
influences the (flexible) exchange rate indirectly by
the influence of the interest rate on the supply of
and demand for Canadian dollars.
The Bank recognizes this influence. It also
recognizes that the exchange rate influences the
state of demand in Canada and, through that
influence, feeds into the inflation rate. A low
dollar boosts the demand for Canadian-produced
goods and services, which, in turn, brings a
potential for higher inflation. And a strong dollar
can give Canadian producers a hard time on world
markets, which, in turn, brings a potential for
lower inflation.
8 Some of these influences of the
exchange rate are reflected in the output gap itself,
but other influences might act directly on the
inflation rate through their effects on prices.
So the exchange rate matters for the Bank’s
interest rate setting. But the exchange rate does
not depend only on the interest rate in Canada. It
also depends on (among many other things) the
interest differential with the United States. And
that differential is driven by the interest rate
decisions of the Federal Reserve – by the federal
funds rate target. Because the federal funds rate
influences the exchange rate and the exchange rate
influences the inflation rate, we might expect the
Bank of Canada to take account of both the
exchange rate and the federal funds rate when it
sets its target for the overnight rate.
Adding these two variables to the three
previously discussed gives us five: the previous
overnight interest rate level, the output gap, the
expected inflation rate, the federal funds rate, and
the exchange rate. Together, these influences
account for 91.5 percent of the variability in the
Bank’s overnight rate target, thus improving our
ability to predict the Bank’s interest rate decision.
Equation 5 in Table 1 shows the details, and
Figure 1 shows the actual, predicted, and
unexplained 8.5 percent of fluctuations in the
overnight rate target.
9
Equation 5 tells us the responsiveness of the
target overnight rate to the five influences on it.
But it does not tell us which of these variables has
fluctuated most to contribute to the fluctuations
in the overnight rate. Figure 2 fills in this detail. It
shows, perhaps surprisingly, that, because of its
high variability, the federal funds rate has been the
biggest single influence on the Bank’s decision.
Fluctuations in the output gap come second.
These two variables together account for most of
the cycles in the overnight rate target. The exchange
rate accounts for some very slight trends, upward
from 1994 through 2003 and downward after 2003.
The expected inflation rate also accounts for
lower-frequency changes, downward through
1998 and flat since then.
Looking at the past influences on the overnight
rate target reinforces the conclusion that the rate is
not going to rise anytime soon. With a continued
negative output gap, a near-zero federal funds rate,
and a strong Canadian dollar, if the Bank behaves
as it has done since 1994, it will hold the overnight
rate at 1 percent until either the output gap
shrinks significantly or the Fed starts to move up
the federal funds rate. The Fed does not seem to
be in a hurry to ease off its monetary stimulus. It
8 But sometimes, a strong dollar is the consequence of exporters’ having had an unsustainably easy time.
9 A more thorough econometric investigation, in addition to taking more accurate measures of information available at each decision date,
should also allow for a more general stochastic process than implied by equation 5, which assumes well-behaved residuals. In fact, it appears
that the residuals in equation 5 have a modest amount of (negative) autocorrelation. I estimated the equation (by two-stage least squares)
with zero, two, and three lagged values of the target overnight rate, and while the details differ, the broad story of equation 5 is robust and
unchanged by these alternative specifications. In the two-lag version, the residuals are free from autocorrelation. See Table 1, note 7, for details.almost certainly will want to start unwinding its
quantitative easing and reduce the size of its
balance sheet before it starts to raise the federal
funds rate, so that source of an eventual rate
increase in Canada is some way in the future.
Concerns about Keeping the Rate
Low for an Extended Period
If the Bank of Canada is right in its assessment
that, by mid-2012, inflation will be at 2 percent
and the output gap will have closed, then
monetary policy should have achieved a neutral
stance before that time, and the Bank will have to
set an overnight rate consistent with that goal.
“Neutral” is easy to define but hard to measure.
The Bank does not reveal what it regards as a
neutral rate and no definitive estimate of its level
exists. The average overnight rate between 1994
and 2007 was 4.1 percent and the average
between 2001 and 2007 was 3.5 percent.
10 The
OECD’s reading is that neutral lies between 
3.5 percent and 4.5 percent (OECD 2010). 
My own view is that, in current circumstances,
that range is on the high side but not by much,
and I think it is reasonable to regard 3 percent 
as the overnight rate consistent with neutral
monetary policy.
11














































Actual overnight rate Predicted overnight rate Residual (unexplained)
Figure 1: Actual, Predicted, and Unexplained Overnight Rate Changes, 1994-2010
Source: Author’s calculations from target overnight rate, output gap, Bank of Canada; yield spread on conventional Government of Canada
bonds and real-return bonds, Statistics Canada, Table 176-0041 (long-term bonds); exchange rate, Pacific Exchange Rate service,
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca; federal funds rate, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
10 Starting in 1994 avoids the period of inflation reduction and recession of the early 1990s, and ending in 2007 avoids the financial crisis.
11 Fiscal tightening and post-financial-crisis effects are two factors that might be pushing the neutral rate a bit below its historical average range.Backgrounder 139 | 7
Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
Output gap Expected inflation rate
























































Figure 2: Contributions to Fluctuations in the Overnight Rate Target, 1994-2010
Source: Author’s calculations from target overnight rate, output gap, Bank of Canada; yield spread on conventional Government of Canada
bonds and real-return bonds, Statistics Canada, Table 176-0041 (long-term bonds); exchange rate, Pacific Exchange Rate service,
http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca; federal funds rate, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
If the overnight rate target is to get to 3 percent
by mid-2012, it needs eight jumps of 25 basis
points each. If the process were to begin on July 19,
2011 (the next decision date at the time of writing),
it will need to rise by 25 basis points on every
decision day through May 2012. It is true that the
rate can go up in larger steps, but that has an air
of panic that would be better avoided.
As more “no-change” decisions are made,
inflation expectations might begin to slip loose of
their anchor. Further, with the Fed continuing to
hold a near-zero rate, the US dollar is likely to
continue its steady slide.
12 If the Canadian dollar
moves at least partially with the US dollar, because
the Bank of Canada keeps its interest rate close to
the federal funds rate, the higher inflation rates of
energy and other commodity prices that are currently
deemed temporary might start to look permanent.
Alongside these concerns is the limited direct
effect that monetary policy has on the course 
of real GDP growth, the output gap, and the
unemployment rate. As the Bank repeatedly states,
the best contribution that monetary policy can
make to these objectives is to achieve a low and
predictable inflation rate. Too vigorous a direct
pursuit of output and employment objectives in
the short term might end up spilling over into
inflation as the real economy remains stubbornly
unresponsive.
12 The slide has been quite general with changes in the year ended 29 June 2011 as follows: Japanese yen, -8.6; Mexican peso, -8.3; British
pound, -6.1; European euro, -15.5; Swiss franc, -22.8; Brazilian real, -13.1; and Canadian dollar, -7.8.| 8 Backgrounder 139
The forgoing concerns are statements about
risks, not central forecasts. But they are risks that,
if they occur, bring an ugly set of policy choices. 
A return to seriously above-target inflation can be
addressed only with seriously above-normal
interest rates. That is a risk worth avoiding. And it
can be avoided only by embarking sooner, rather
than later, on the process of steadily increasing the
overnight rate target.
The Bank sees the risks between rising inflation
and a stalling recovery as balanced. If this view is
correct, and the Bank is in as good a position as
any other observer to make this call, it does not
translate into a balanced policy response. Balanced
upside and downside risks call for a policy response
that moves the balance away from the upside.
There are two asymmetries that make an
inflation risk worse than a deflation risk. The first
is an asymmetry in how far off course the inflation
rate might go. Natural real forces limit the fall in
inflation, while there is no natural upper limit.
Unanchored inflation expectations can lead
quickly to above-target, even to double-digit,
inflation. The second asymmetry is in the cost of
correcting a mistake. If a rise in the interest rate
leads to inflation’s falling below target, a swift
reversal and cut in the interest rate can correct the
problem. If holding the interest rate too low for too
long unleashes a new inflation, the interest rate
needs to be raised not to neutral but to well above
that level, and the inflation rate can return to
target only at the cost of a policy-induced recession.
I have predicted that the Bank will hold the
overnight rate target at 1 percent for a further
period, perhaps until the final quarter of 2011. 
I hope that this prediction proves wrong, and I
urge the Governing Council to begin the process
of reducing monetary stimulus when it announces
the next interest rate decision on July 19, 2011.
C.D. Howe InstituteBackgrounder 139 | 9
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